theory 
Papers (136)
| # | Title | |
| 1. | Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014. | |
| 2. | The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol : Analysis and Applications Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Leonardos, Nikos. 2014. | |
| 3. | The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013. | |
| 4. | Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions Gentry, Craig and Wichs, Daniel. 2011. | |
| 5. | Secure multiparty computations on bitcoin Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014. | |
| 6. | Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011. | |
| 7. | How to use Bitcoin to design fair protocols Bentov, Iddo and Kumaresan, Ranjit. 2014. | |
| 8. | On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016. | |
| 9. | Succinct non-interactive arguments via linear interactive proofs Bitansky, Nir and Chiesa, Alessandro and Ishai, Yuval and Paneth, Omer and Ostrovsky, Rafail. 2013. | |
| 10. | Recursive composition and bootstrapping for SNARKs and proof-carrying data Bitansky, Nir and Canetti, Ran and Chiesa, Alessandro and Tromer, Eran. 2013. | |
| 11. | On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011. | |
| 12. | The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol with Chains of Variable Difficulty Juan A. Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Nikos Leonardos. 2016. | |
| 13. | Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015. | |
| 14. | SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain Eskandari, Shayan and Moosavi, Seyedehmahsa and Clark, Jeremy. 2019. | |
| 15. | Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018. | |
| 16. | Speed-Security Tradeoffs in Blockchain Protocols Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2015. | |
| 17. | Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016. | |
| 18. | Fair two-party computations via bitcoin deposits Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan and Malinowski, Daniel and Mazurek, Lukasz. 2014. | |
| 19. | Scalable Multi-party Computation for zk-SNARK Parameters in the Random Beacon Model Sean Bowe and Ariel Gabizon and Ian Miers. 2017. | |
| 20. | On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015. | |
| 21. | Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015. | |
| 22. | DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019. | |
| 23. | Credible auctions: A trilemma Akbarpour, Mohammad and Li, Shengwu. 2020. | |
| 24. | Publicly Verifiable Proofs of Sequential Work Mahmoody, Mohammad and Moran, Tal and Vadhan, Salil. 2013. | |
| 25. | Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015. | |
| 26. | Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017. | |
| 27. | The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018. | |
| 28. | BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019. | |
| 29. | Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016. | |
| 30. | Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Roughgarden, Tim. 2021. | |
| 31. | Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018. | |
| 32. | Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020. | |
| 33. | When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015. | |
| 34. | Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018. | |
| 35. | SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019. | |
| 36. | Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Hao Chung and Elaine Shi. 2022. | |
| 37. | Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017. | |
| 38. | Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019. | |
| 39. | Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018. | |
| 40. | Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG Malkhi, Dahlia and Szalachowski, Pawel. 2022. | |
| 41. | On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019. | |
| 42. | Storing and Retrieving Secrets on a Blockchain Vipul Goyal and Abhiram Kothapalli and Elisaweta Masserova and Bryan Parno and Yifan Song. 2020. | |
| 43. | Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019. | |
| 44. | Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019. | |
| 45. | Economic implications of scaling blockchains: Why the consensus protocol matters John, Kose and Rivera, Thomas J and Saleh, Fahad. 2020. | |
| 46. | A Composable Security Treatment of the Lightning Network Aggelos Kiayias and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos. 2019. | |
| 47. | Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels Lukas Aumayr and Oguzhan Ersoy and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Kristina Hostakova and Matteo Maffei and Pedro Moreno-Sanchez and Siavash Riahi. 2020. | |
| 48. | TARDIS: A Foundation of Time-Lock Puzzles in UC Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael and Nielsen12, Jesper Buus and Oechsner, Sabine. 2020. | |
| 49. | Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities Heimbach, Lioba and Kiffer, Lucianna and Torres, Christof Ferreira and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2023. | |
| 50. | SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019. | |
| 51. | Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020. | |
| 52. | On the (in) security of SNARKs in the presence of oracles Fiore, Dario and Nitulescu, Anca. 2016. | |
| 53. | Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018. | |
| 54. | A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019. | |
| 55. | Reducing Participation Costs via Incremental Verification for Ledger Systems Weikeng Chen and Alessandro Chiesa and Emma Dauterman and Nicholas P. Ward. 2020. | |
| 56. | Distributed Cryptography Based on the Proofs of Work. Andrychowicz, Marcin and Dziembowski, Stefan. 2014. | |
| 57. | Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges Shi, Zeshun and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola and Zhao, Zhiming. 2022. | |
| 58. | Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2020. | |
| 59. | On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020. | |
| 60. | Generic-Group Delay Functions Require Hidden-Order Groups Lior Rotem and Gil Segev and Ido Shahaf. 2020. | |
| 61. | Resource-Restricted Cryptography: Revisiting MPC Bounds in the Proof-of-Work Era Garay, Juan and Kiayias, Aggelos and Ostrovsky, Rafail M and Panagiotakos, Giorgos and Zikas, Vassilis. 2020. | |
| 62. | Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019. | |
| 63. | Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols Caspar Schwarz-Schilling and Fahad Saleh and Thomas Thiery and Jennifer Pan and Nihar Shah and Barnabé Monnot. 2023. | |
| 64. | An analysis of the algebraic group model Katz, Jonathan and Zhang, Cong and Zhou, Hong-Sheng. 2022. | |
| 65. | A Security Framework for Distributed Ledgers Christoph Egger and Mike Graf and Ralf Kuesters and Daniel Rausch and Viktoria Ronge and and Dominique Schröder. 2021. | |
| 66. | Witness-Succinct Universally-Composable SNARKs Ganesh, Chaya and Kondi, Yashvanth and Orlandi, Claudio and Pancholi, Mahak and Takahashi, Akira and Tschudi, Daniel. 2022. | |
| 67. | Founding Secure Computation on Blockchains Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek. 2019. | |
| 68. | Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019. | |
| 69. | Lower Bounds for Off-Chain Protocols: Exploring the Limits of Plasma Stefan Dziembowski and Grzegorz Fabiański and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2020. | |
| 70. | A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018. | |
| 71. | Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014. | |
| 72. | NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020. | |
| 73. | Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020. | |
| 74. | CRAFT: Composable Randomness Beacons and Output-Independent Abort MPC From Time-Lock Puzzles Carsten Baum and Bernardo David and Rafael Dowsley and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Sabine Oechsner. 2020. | |
| 75. | Information Theoretic HotStuff Abraham, Ittai and Stern, Gilad. 2020. | |
| 76. | Transparent Batchable Time-lock Puzzles and Applications to Byzantine Consensus Shravan Srinivasan and Julian Loss and Giulio Malavolta and Kartik Nayak and Charalampos Papamanthou and Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan. 2022. | |
| 77. | On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019. | |
| 78. | Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020. | |
| 79. | Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains Tarun Chitra and Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Kshitij Kulkarni. 2023. | |
| 80. | Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019. | |
| 81. | Complexity-Approximation Trade-offs in Exchange Mechanisms: AMMs vs. LOBs Milionis, Jason and Moallemi, Ciamac C. and Roughgarden, Tim. 2023. | |
| 82. | Large-Scale Non-Interactive Threshold Cryptosystems in the YOSO Model Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Siavash Riahi. 2021. | |
| 83. | Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Ke Wu and Elaine Shi and Hao Chung. 2023. | |
| 84. | State Machine Replication under Changing Network Conditions Andreea B. Alexandru and Erica Blum and Jonathan Katz and Julian Loss. 2022. | |
| 85. | Algebraic Group Model with Oblivious Sampling Helger Lipmaa and Roberto Parisella and Janno Siim. 2023. | |
| 86. | Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees Tas, Ertem Nusret and Boneh, Dan. 2022. | |
| 87. | Simple, Fast, Efficient, and Tightly-Secure Non-Malleable Non-Interactive Timed Commitments Peter Chvojka and Tibor Jager. 2022. | |
| 88. | The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden. 2019. | |
| 89. | Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020. | |
| 90. | Sweep-UC: Swapping Coins Privately Hanzlik, Lucjan and Loss, Julian and Thyagarajan, Sri AravindaKrishnan and Wagner, Benedikt. 2022. | |
| 91. | Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019. | |
| 92. | Barriers for Succinct Arguments in the Random Oracle Model Alessandro Chiesa and Eylon Yogev. 2020. | |
| 93. | Cicada: A framework for private non-interactive on-chain auctions and voting Noemi Glaeser and István András Seres and Michael Zhu and Joseph Bonneau. 2023. | |
| 94. | Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020. | |
| 95. | On the (Ir)Replaceability of Global Setups, or How (Not) to Use a Global Ledger Christian Badertscher and Julia Hesse and Vassilis Zikas. 2020. | |
| 96. | Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain Abraham, Ittai and Dolev, Danny and Eyal, Ittay and Halpern, Joseph Y. 2022. | |
| 97. | Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators Akaki Mamageishvili and Edward W. Felten. 2023. | |
| 98. | Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017. | |
| 99. | Impossibility on the Schnorr Signature from the One-more DL Assumption in the Non-programmable Random Oracle Model Masayuki Fukumitsu and Shingo Hasegawa. 2020. | |
| 100. | Publicly Verifiable Zero Knowledge from (Collapsing) Blockchains Scafuro, Alessandra and Siniscalchi, Luisa and Visconti, Ivan. 2020. | |
| 101. | A theoretical basis for Blockchain Extractable Value Bartoletti, Massimo and Zunino, Roberto. 2023. | |
| 102. | Limits in the Provable Security of ECDSA Signatures Dominik Hartmann and Eike Kiltz. 2023. | |
| 103. | On Soundness Notions for Interactive Oracle Proofs Alexander R. Block and Albert Garreta and Pratyush Ranjan Tiwari and Michał Zając. 2023. | |
| 104. | Transaction fee mechanism for Proof-of-Stake protocol Wenpin Tang and David D. Yao. 2023. | |
| 105. | Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021. | |
| 106. | FairPoS: Input Fairness in Proof-of-Stake with Adaptive Security James Hsin-yu Chiang and Bernardo David and Ittay Eyal and Tiantian Gong. 2022. | |
| 107. | The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms Mazorra, Bruno and Della Penna, Nicolás. 2023. | |
| 108. | Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Canetti, Ran and Fiat, Amos and Gonczarowski, Yannai A.. 2023. | |
| 109. | On the Impossibility of Algebraic NIZK In Pairing-Free Groups Emanuele Giunta. 2023. | |
| 110. | The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value Angeris, Guillermo and Chitra, Tarun and Diamandis, Theo and Kulkarni, Kshitij. 2023. | |
| 111. | Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions Bruno Mazorra and Nicolás Della Penna. 2023. | |
| 112. | EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies Davide Crapis and Edward W. Felten and Akaki Mamageishvili. 2023. | |
| 113. | Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020. | |
| 114. | Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets Diamandis, Theo and Evans, Alex and Chitra, Tarun and Angeris, Guillermo. 2022. | |
| 115. | Ponyta: Foundations of Side-Contract-Resilient Fair Exchange Hao Chung and Elisaweta Masserova and Elaine Shi and Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan. 2022. | |
| 116. | Transaction Fee Mining and Mechanism Design Tang, Michael and Zhang, Alex. 2023. | |
| 117. | IRS: An Incentive-compatible Reward Scheme for Algorand Liao, Maizi and Golab, Wojciech and Zahedi, Seyed Majid. 2023. | |
| 118. | Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks Zeta Avarikioti and Stefan Schmid and Samarth Tiwari. 2023. | |
| 119. | Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Jan Christoph. 2023. | |
| 120. | Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019. | |
| 121. | How much is the fork? Fast Probability and Profitability Calculation during Temporary Forks Judmayer, Aljosha and Stifter, Nicholas and Schindler, Philipp and Weippel, Edgar. 2022. | |
| 122. | Insured MPC: Efficient Secure Multiparty Computation with Punishable Abort Baum, Carsten and David, Bernardo and Dowsley, Rafael. 2018. | |
| 123. | Iterated Search Problems and Blockchain Security under Falsifiable Assumptions Garay, Juan A and Kiayias, Aggelos and Panagiotakos, Giorgos. 2019. | |
| 124. | TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019. | |
| 125. | Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019. | |
| 126. | Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020. | |
| 127. | MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020. | |
| 128. | Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020. | |
| 129. | Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020. | |
| 130. | SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020. | |
| 131. | When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021. | |
| 132. | Semantics and complexity of bitcoin script Reisenegger Butr\'on, Thomas. 2021. | |
| 133. | Understanding rollup economics from first principles Monnot, Barnabé. 2022. | |
| 134. | Side Contract Commitment Attacks on Blockchains Landis, Daji and Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.. 2023. | |
| 135. | A Universally Composable Non-interactive Aggregate Cash System Jia, Yanxue and Sun, Shi-Feng and Zhou, Hong-Sheng and Gu, Dawu. 2023. | |
| 136. | Leveraging Machine Learning for Bidding Strategies in Miner Extractable Value (MEV) Auctions Christoffer Raun and Benjamin Estermann and Liyi Zhou and Kaihua Qin and Roger Wattenhofer and Arthur Gervais and Ye Wang. 2023. |
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