Papers (91)

#Title
Citations
1.Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014.   
2766
2.The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013.
795
3.Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011.
462
4.On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016.
400
5.On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011.
384
6.Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015.
269
7.Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018.
219
8.Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016.
213
9.On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015.
189
10.SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain Eskandari, Shayan and Moosavi, Seyedehmahsa and Clark, Jeremy. 2019.
187
11.Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015.
159
12.Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015.
131
13.Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017.
116
14.Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016.
115
15.The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018.
112
16.Credible auctions: A trilemma Akbarpour, Mohammad and Li, Shengwu. 2020.
111
17.When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015.
108
18.DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019.   
107
19.Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018.
102
20.BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019.
86
21.Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018.
80
22.Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017.
78
23.SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019.
78
24.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020.   
62
25.Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Roughgarden, Tim. 2021.   
59
26.Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018.
57
27.Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019.
56
28.On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019.
55
29.Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019.
53
30.MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020.  
50
31.Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019.
46
32.SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019.
41
33.Economic implications of scaling blockchains: Why the consensus protocol matters John, Kose and Rivera, Thomas J and Saleh, Fahad. 2020.
39
34.Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018.
37
35.A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019.
34
36.Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020.
31
37.Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG Malkhi, Dahlia and Szalachowski, Pawel. 2022.
31
38.On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020.
30
39.Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Hao Chung and Elaine Shi. 2022.   
30
40.Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2020.
25
41.Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014.
23
42.Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019.
23
43.A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018.
21
44.Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019.
18
45.SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020.
18
46.Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020.
16
47.On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019.
15
48.Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020.
13
49.Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019.
10
50.Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges Shi, Zeshun and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola and Zhao, Zhiming. 2022.
10
51.Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020.
9
52.NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020.
7
53.Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities Heimbach, Lioba and Kiffer, Lucianna and Torres, Christof Ferreira and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2023.
7
54.Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017.
5
55.Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019.
5
56.Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020.
5
57.Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains Tarun Chitra and Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Kshitij Kulkarni. 2023.
5
58.Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020.
3
59.Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020.
3
60.Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021.
3
61.Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain Abraham, Ittai and Dolev, Danny and Eyal, Ittay and Halpern, Joseph Y. 2022.
3
62.A theoretical basis for Blockchain Extractable Value Bartoletti, Massimo and Zunino, Roberto. 2023.
3
63.Complexity-Approximation Trade-offs in Exchange Mechanisms: AMMs vs. LOBs Milionis, Jason and Moallemi, Ciamac C. and Roughgarden, Tim. 2023.
3
64.Ponyta: Foundations of Side-Contract-Resilient Fair Exchange Hao Chung and Elisaweta Masserova and Elaine Shi and Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan. 2022.
3
65.Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees Tas, Ertem Nusret and Boneh, Dan. 2022.
2
66.Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Ke Wu and Elaine Shi and Hao Chung. 2023.
2
67.Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols Caspar Schwarz-Schilling and Fahad Saleh and Thomas Thiery and Jennifer Pan and Nihar Shah and Barnabé Monnot. 2023.
2
68.Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions Bruno Mazorra and Nicolás Della Penna. 2023.
2
69.Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019.
1
70.The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms Mazorra, Bruno and Della Penna, Nicolás. 2023.
1
71.Transaction fee mechanism for Proof-of-Stake protocol Wenpin Tang and David D. Yao. 2023.
1
72.The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value Angeris, Guillermo and Chitra, Tarun and Diamandis, Theo and Kulkarni, Kshitij. 2023.
1
73.TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019.
0
74.Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019.
0
75.Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020.
0
76.Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020.
0
77.When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021.
0
78.How much is the fork? Fast Probability and Profitability Calculation during Temporary Forks Judmayer, Aljosha and Stifter, Nicholas and Schindler, Philipp and Weippel, Edgar. 2022.
0
79.Understanding rollup economics from first principles Monnot, Barnabé. 2022.
0
80.FairPoS: Input Fairness in Proof-of-Stake with Adaptive Security James Hsin-yu Chiang and Bernardo David and Ittay Eyal and Tiantian Gong. 2022.
0
81.Side Contract Commitment Attacks on Blockchains Landis, Daji and Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.. 2023.
0
82.Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets Diamandis, Theo and Evans, Alex and Chitra, Tarun and Angeris, Guillermo. 2022.   
0
83.Transaction Fee Mining and Mechanism Design Tang, Michael and Zhang, Alex. 2023.
0
84.Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Canetti, Ran and Fiat, Amos and Gonczarowski, Yannai A.. 2023.
0
85.IRS: An Incentive-compatible Reward Scheme for Algorand Liao, Maizi and Golab, Wojciech and Zahedi, Seyed Majid. 2023.
0
86.Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks Zeta Avarikioti and Stefan Schmid and Samarth Tiwari. 2023.
0
87.Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators Akaki Mamageishvili and Edward W. Felten. 2023.
0
88.Leveraging Machine Learning for Bidding Strategies in Miner Extractable Value (MEV) Auctions Christoffer Raun and Benjamin Estermann and Liyi Zhou and Kaihua Qin and Roger Wattenhofer and Arthur Gervais and Ye Wang. 2023.
0
89.Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Jan Christoph. 2023.
0
90.EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies Davide Crapis and Edward W. Felten and Akaki Mamageishvili. 2023.
0
91.Cicada: A framework for private non-interactive on-chain auctions and voting Noemi Glaeser and István András Seres and Michael Zhu and Joseph Bonneau. 2023.
0

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