game-theory

Papers (91)
# | Title | |
1. | Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is vulnerable Eyal, Ittay and Gün Sirer, Emin. 2014. ![]() ![]() | |
2. | The economics of Bitcoin mining, or Bitcoin in the presence of adversaries Kroll, Joshua A and Davey, Ian C and Felten, Edward W. 2013. | |
3. | Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems Rosenfeld, Meni. 2011. | |
4. | On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward Carlsten, Miles and Kalodner, Harry and Weinberg, S Matthew and Narayanan, Arvind. 2016. | |
5. | On Bitcoin and red balloons Babaioff, Moshe and Dobzinski, Shahar and Oren, Sigal and Zohar, Aviv. 2011. | |
6. | Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer Luu, Loi and Teutsch, Jason and Kulkarni, Raghav and Saxena, Prateek. 2015. | |
7. | SoK: Transparent Dishonesty: front-running attacks on Blockchain Eskandari, Shayan and Moosavi, Seyedehmahsa and Clark, Jeremy. 2019. | |
8. | Astraea: A decentralized blockchain oracle Adler, John and Berryhill, Ryan and Veneris, Andreas and Poulos, Zissis and Veira, Neil and Kastania, Anastasia. 2018. | |
9. | Incentive Compatibility of Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Functions Schrijvers, Okke and Bonneau, Joseph and Boneh, Dan and Roughgarden, Tim. 2016. | |
10. | On power splitting games in distributed computation: The case of bitcoin pooled mining Luu, Loi and Saha, Ratul and Parameshwaran, Inian and Saxena, Prateek and Hobor, Aquinas. 2015. | |
11. | Trends, tips, tolls: A longitudinal study of Bitcoin transaction fees M\"oser, Malte and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2015. | |
12. | DECO: Liberating Web Data Using Decentralized Oracles for TLS Zhang, Fan and Maram, Sai Krishna Deepak and Malvai, Harjasleen and Goldfeder, Steven and Juels, Ari. 2019. ![]() ![]() | |
13. | Credible auctions: A trilemma Akbarpour, Mohammad and Li, Shengwu. 2020. | |
14. | Validation of decentralised smart contracts through game theory and formal methods Bigi, Giancarlo and Bracciali, Andrea and Meacci, Giovanni and Tuosto, Emilio. 2015. | |
15. | Incentivizing blockchain forks via whale transactions Liao, Kevin and Katz, Jonathan. 2017. | |
16. | The Gap Game Tsabary, Itay and Eyal, Ittay. 2018. | |
17. | BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service Michael Mirkin and Yan Ji and Jonathan Pang and Ariah Klages-Mundt and Ittay Eyal and Ari Jules. 2019. | |
18. | Solidus: An Incentive-compatible Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus Abraham, Ittai and Malkhi, Dahlia and Nayak, Kartik and Ren, Ling and Spiegelman, Alexander. 2016. | |
19. | Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Roughgarden, Tim. 2021. ![]() ![]() | |
20. | Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols Brown-Cohen, Jonah and Narayanan, Arvind and Psomas, Christos-Alexandros and Weinberg, S Matthew. 2018. | |
21. | Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 Roughgarden, Tim. 2020. ![]() ![]() | |
22. | When bitcoin mining pools run dry Laszka, Aron and Johnson, Benjamin and Grossklags, Jens. 2015. | |
23. | Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies Fanti, Giulia and Kogan, Leonid and Oh, Sewoong and Ruan, Kathleen and Viswanath, Pramod and Wang, Gerui. 2018. | |
24. | SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning Hou, Charlie and Zhou, Mingxun and Ji, Yan and Daian, Phil and Tramer, Florian and Fanti, Giulia and Juels, Ari. 2019. | |
25. | Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Hao Chung and Elaine Shi. 2022. ![]() ![]() | |
26. | Socially Optimal Mining Pools Ben A. Fisch and Rafael Pass and Abhi Shelat. 2017. | |
27. | Power Adjusting and Bribery Racing: Novel Mining Attacks in the Bitcoin System Gao, Shang and Li, Zecheng and Peng, Zhe and Xiao, Bin. 2019. | |
28. | Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools Br\"unjes, Lars and Kiayias, Aggelos and Koutsoupias, Elias and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2018. | |
29. | Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Protection on a DAG Malkhi, Dahlia and Szalachowski, Pawel. 2022. | |
30. | On the optionality and fairness of Atomic Swaps Han, Runchao and Lin, Haoyu and Yu, Jiangshan. 2019. | |
31. | Cerberus Channels: Incentivizing Watchtowers for Bitcoin Georgia Avarikioti and Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019. | |
32. | Temporary censorship attacks in the presence of rational miners Winzer, Fredrik and Herd, Benjamin and Faust, Sebastian. 2019. | |
33. | Economic implications of scaling blockchains: Why the consensus protocol matters John, Kose and Rivera, Thomas J and Saleh, Fahad. 2020. | |
34. | Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities Heimbach, Lioba and Kiffer, Lucianna and Torres, Christof Ferreira and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2023. | |
35. | SoK: Tools for Game Theoretic Models of Security for Cryptocurrencies Azouvi, Sarah and Hicks, Alexander. 2019. | |
36. | Ride the lightning: The game theory of payment channels Avarikioti, Zeta and Heimbach, Lioba and Wang, Yuyi and Wattenhofer, Roger. 2020. | |
37. | Betting on Blockchain Consensus with Fantomette Azouvi, Sarah and McCorry, Patrick and Meiklejohn, Sarah. 2018. | |
38. | A percolation model for the emergence of the Bitcoin Lightning Network Bartolucci, Silvia and Caccioli, Fabio and Vivo, Pierpaolo. 2019. | |
39. | Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges Shi, Zeshun and de Laat, Cees and Grosso, Paola and Zhao, Zhiming. 2022. | |
40. | Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments Matheus V. X. Ferreira and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2020. | |
41. | On the Profitability of Selfish Mining Against Multiple Difficulty Adjustment Algorithms Michael Davidson and Tyler Diamond. 2020. | |
42. | Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol Neuder, Michael and Moroz, Daniel J and Rao, Rithvik and Parkes, David C. 2019. | |
43. | Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols Caspar Schwarz-Schilling and Fahad Saleh and Thomas Thiery and Jennifer Pan and Nihar Shah and Barnabé Monnot. 2023. | |
44. | Rationality is Self-Defeating in Permissionless Systems Ford, Bryan and B\"ohme, Rainer. 2019. | |
45. | A Systematic Approach To Cryptocurrency Fees Alexander Chepurnoy and Vasily Kharin and Dmitry Meshkov. 2018. | |
46. | Rational zero: Economic security for zerocoin with everlasting anonymity Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Miers, Ian and Rubin, Aviel D. 2014. | |
47. | NC-Max: Breaking the Security-Performance Tradeoff in Nakamoto Consensus Ren Zhang and Dingwei Zhang and Quake Wang and Shichen Wu and Jan Xie and Bart Preneel. 2020. | |
48. | Short Selling Attack: A Self-Destructive But Profitable 51% Attack On PoS Blockchains Suhyeon Lee and Seungjoo Kim. 2020. | |
49. | On Profitability of Nakamoto double spend Grunspan, Cyril and P\'erez-Marco, Ricardo. 2019. | |
50. | Game theoretical framework for analyzing Blockchains Robustness Paolo Zappalà and Marianna Belotti and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Stefano Secci. 2020. | |
51. | Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains Tarun Chitra and Matheus V. X. Ferreira and Kshitij Kulkarni. 2023. | |
52. | Coalition-Safe Equilibria with Virtual Payoffs Kiayias, Aggelos and Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota. 2019. | |
53. | Complexity-Approximation Trade-offs in Exchange Mechanisms: AMMs vs. LOBs Milionis, Jason and Moallemi, Ciamac C. and Roughgarden, Tim. 2023. | |
54. | Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Ke Wu and Elaine Shi and Hao Chung. 2023. | |
55. | Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees Tas, Ertem Nusret and Boneh, Dan. 2022. | |
56. | Pricing ASICs for Cryptocurrency Mining Yaish, Aviv and Zohar, Aviv. 2020. | |
57. | Incentives Don't Solve Blockchain's Problems Ketsdever, Shea and Fischer, Michael J. 2019. | |
58. | Cicada: A framework for private non-interactive on-chain auctions and voting Noemi Glaeser and István András Seres and Michael Zhu and Joseph Bonneau. 2023. | |
59. | Selfish Mining Attacks Exacerbated by Elastic Hash Supply Shibuya, Yoko and Yamamoto, Go and Kojima, Fuhito and Shi, Elaine and Matsuo, Shin’ichiro and Laszka, Aron. 2020. | |
60. | Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain Abraham, Ittai and Dolev, Danny and Eyal, Ittay and Halpern, Joseph Y. 2022. | |
61. | Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators Akaki Mamageishvili and Edward W. Felten. 2023. | |
62. | Incentives in casper the friendly finality gadget Buterin, Vitalik. 2017. | |
63. | A theoretical basis for Blockchain Extractable Value Bartoletti, Massimo and Zunino, Roberto. 2023. | |
64. | Transaction fee mechanism for Proof-of-Stake protocol Wenpin Tang and David D. Yao. 2023. | |
65. | Smart Proofs via Smart Contracts: Succinct and Informative Mathematical Derivations via Decentralized Markets Carr\'e, Sylvain and Gabriel, Franck and Hongler, Cl\'ement and Lacerda, Gustavo and Capano, Gloria. 2021. | |
66. | FairPoS: Input Fairness in Proof-of-Stake with Adaptive Security James Hsin-yu Chiang and Bernardo David and Ittay Eyal and Tiantian Gong. 2022. | |
67. | The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms Mazorra, Bruno and Della Penna, Nicolás. 2023. | |
68. | Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms Canetti, Ran and Fiat, Amos and Gonczarowski, Yannai A.. 2023. | |
69. | The Specter (and Spectra) of Miner Extractable Value Angeris, Guillermo and Chitra, Tarun and Diamandis, Theo and Kulkarni, Kshitij. 2023. | |
70. | Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions Bruno Mazorra and Nicolás Della Penna. 2023. | |
71. | EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies Davide Crapis and Edward W. Felten and Akaki Mamageishvili. 2023. | |
72. | Economic Principles of PoPCoin, a Democratic Time-based Cryptocurrency Zhang, Haoqian and Basescu, Cristina and Ford, Bryan. 2020. | |
73. | Dynamic Pricing for Non-fungible Resources: Designing Multidimensional Blockchain Fee Markets Diamandis, Theo and Evans, Alex and Chitra, Tarun and Angeris, Guillermo. 2022. ![]() ![]() | |
74. | Ponyta: Foundations of Side-Contract-Resilient Fair Exchange Hao Chung and Elisaweta Masserova and Elaine Shi and Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan. 2022. | |
75. | Transaction Fee Mining and Mechanism Design Tang, Michael and Zhang, Alex. 2023. | |
76. | IRS: An Incentive-compatible Reward Scheme for Algorand Liao, Maizi and Golab, Wojciech and Zahedi, Seyed Majid. 2023. | |
77. | Musketeer: Incentive-Compatible Rebalancing for Payment Channel Networks Zeta Avarikioti and Stefan Schmid and Samarth Tiwari. 2023. | |
78. | Shared Sequencing and Latency Competition as a Noisy Contest Mamageishvili, Akaki and Schlegel, Jan Christoph. 2023. | |
79. | Bootstrapping a stable computation token Teutsch, Jason and M\"akel\"a, Sami and Bakshi, Surya. 2019. | |
80. | How much is the fork? Fast Probability and Profitability Calculation during Temporary Forks Judmayer, Aljosha and Stifter, Nicholas and Schindler, Philipp and Weippel, Edgar. 2022. | |
81. | TULIP: A Fully Incentive Compatible Blockchain Framework Amortizing Redundant Communication Ersoy, Oguzhan and Zekeriya, Erkin and Lagendijk, Reginald L. 2019. | |
82. | Just Enough Security: Reducing Proof-of-Work Ecological Footprint Tsabary, Itay and Spiegelman, Alexander and Eyal, Ittay. 2019. | |
83. | Rational Behavior in Committee-Based Blockchains Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Bruno Biais and Maria Potop-Butucaru and Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni. 2020. | |
84. | MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack Itay Tsabary and Matan Yechieli and Ittay Eyal. 2020. ![]() | |
85. | Undercutting Bitcoin Is Not Profitable Tiantian Gong and Mohsen Minaei and Wenhai Sun and Aniket Kate. 2020. | |
86. | Achieving State Machine Replication without Honesty Assumptions McMenamin, Conor and Daza, Vanesa and Pontecorvi, Matteo. 2020. | |
87. | SoK: Algorithmic Incentive Manipulation Attacks on Permissionless PoW Cryptocurrencies Aljosha Judmayer and Nicholas Stifter and Alexei Zamyatin and Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal and Peter Gaži and Sarah Meiklejohn and Edgar Weippl. 2020. | |
88. | When Nakamoto Meets Nash: Blockchain Breakthrough Through the Lens of Game Theory (Invited Talk) Abraham, Ittai. 2021. | |
89. | Understanding rollup economics from first principles Monnot, Barnabé. 2022. | |
90. | Side Contract Commitment Attacks on Blockchains Landis, Daji and Schwartzbach, Nikolaj I.. 2023. | |
91. | Leveraging Machine Learning for Bidding Strategies in Miner Extractable Value (MEV) Auctions Christoffer Raun and Benjamin Estermann and Liyi Zhou and Kaihua Qin and Roger Wattenhofer and Arthur Gervais and Ye Wang. 2023. |
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